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9 OCTOBER 1956

SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

I. At each of our last three meetings, the Council has been told of some new development affecting the USSR in its relations with Eastern Europe--and with Yugoslavia in particular. We had Khrushchev's sudden "vacation" visit to Tito on 19 September, and Tito's dramatic return visit to Yalta on 27 September. As motivation for these visits, we had evidence of Soviet concern over the too-rapid progress of "liberalization" in Satellite Poland and Hungary, and the clear indication that the Soviet leadership feared Yugoslavia's "independent" influence in the satellites.

II. Although, to date, we have not received the "inside story" on Tito's talks at Yalta, we are now in possession of two extremely sensitive intelligence reports that provide us with invaluable insights to the nature and extent of Soviet-Yugoslav differences.

To present this sensitive information in context, it is necessary to go back for a little and examine what could be called the "three acts" that have been played thusfar in this "drama".

III. Act One centers on last June's Moscow love-fest between Tito and the Soviet leaders. Here, as our sensitive information reveals, the public impression of agreement between the two sides was almost completely misleading. On the contrary, each party had strong and fundamental reservations about the others' position.

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A.

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The Soviets concluded that "significant ideological disagreements" existed between themselves and the Yugoslavs and that the Yugoslavs deviated significantly from the sacred Soviet doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.

B.

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the Yugoslav side of these talks--the Soviet positions to which Tito objected, and the compromises Tito proposed. In summary:

1. The Yugoslavs found the USSR committed to a "Bloc" policy--the preservation of a strongly-united "Socialist camp", unified in action and directed by the USSR.
2. As an aid to such "Socialist unity", the Soviet leaders proposed revival of some sort of Cominform.
3. The Yugoslavs objected, and fought for their concept of Communist party independence. They won the fight.
4. However, the Yugoslavs felt that their victory had been won as a result of a "tactical" retreat by the Kremlin leaders, rather than because the Soviets had been genuinely won over by Tito's arguments.
5. The Yugoslavs nonetheless hoped for a future genuine Soviet acceptance of their views.

III. Thus, Act One came to an end with the two parties squabbling over their ideological dispute and privately agreeing to disagree. We can assume that the Soviet leaders hoped that this failure to settle a basic issue would not be exposed in the near future and that the dispute would remain in the realm of theory. Act Two, as we shall see, destroyed these Soviet hopes.

A. Much of the detail in this Second Act has already been related. In general, they involve the growth of "independence" in the Communist world--"independence" often modelled on Tito, and in many cases encouraged by him.

1. In Poland, where "independence" and "liberalisation" was making great strides, the Poznan riots broke out (28 June).
2. In Hungary, the "little Stalin", party boss Rakosi, lost control and was ousted in mid-July.

B. These events in the Satellites greatly alarmed the Soviet leaders and their attempts at counter-action were swift.

1. On a 18 July visit to Poland, Premier Bulganin laid down the law, warning the Poles of the danger of too rapid "democratization", and sharply pointing out that Poland's western boundary with Germany was only as secure as its alliance with the USSR.
2. Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan travelled to Hungary in mid-July, and presumably salvaged what he could by seeing that a "reliable" man, Gero, replaced Rakosi.

C. The fact remained, however, that neither the Poles nor the Hungarians responded to Moscow's warnings and restraints: the trend toward "democratization" and "independence" within the Polish and Hungarian Communist Parties continued unchecked.

IV. The Soviet conviction that Tito--by example and encouragement--
25X6A was the [REDACTED] is evidenced by the next
Kremlin move to reassert control. This was the USSR's 3 September
secret warning to the Satellites (regarding which I briefed the
Council two weeks ago) that Yugoslavia was not a suitable model
for any self-respecting Satellite to follow. This warning closes
Act Two.

V. Act Three brings us to the events of the past three weeks, beginning
with Khrushchev's arrival in Belgrade on 18 September. The Soviet
motivation for this trip is reasonably clear.

- A. Polish and Hungarian lack of response to the 3 September
warning must have convinced all the Soviet leaders that some-
thing urgent had to be done about the Satellites problem.
- B. The Yugoslavs, for their part, had viewed with alarm the
summer-long retreat from the "liberal" Soviet policy towards
the satellites.
- C. Tito was also alarmed by the USSR's duplicity concerning
the "independent roads" concept and the increasingly
hostile Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia itself.
- D. Because both sides had vested interest in the maintenance of
relations, and neither side desired an open break, person-to-
person conversations appeared necessary to avoid a rupture.

VI. Last week, the Council heard the Yugoslav version of the Khrushchev-
Tito talks in Brioni, in which Khrushchev verified a complete
reversal on the doctrine of "individual roads to socialism."

- A. This reversal, coming from Khrushchev himself--the man the Yugoslavs held to be the most willing among the Soviet leaders to push the new "liberal" policy toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe--was a shock to Tito.
- B. When Khrushchev then invited Tito to Yalta to continue their discussions, Tito accepted--in hopes he could persuade the Soviet leaders to modify their reversal.
- C. During his week at Yalta, Tito met with Bulganin, Voroshilov, Khrushchev (party boss in the Ukraine), General Gorov (the security police chief), and others.

VII. We still do not know the substance of these conversations. However, they almost certainly revolved around the same questions of ideological dispute as last June. Whatever their outcome, the immediate effect has not altered Tito's "independent" standing.

- A. Since Tito's return, Belgrade has become a major focus for visiting Communists. Most of these visits had been arranged long before the Yalta trip, but the dates of some have apparently been advanced.
 1. A Bulgarian "parliamentary" delegation--present in Yugoslavia before Tito's trip--dropped its thin disguise on his return and signed a party-to-party agreement to re-establish ties.
 2. An Italian Communist delegation has arrived, for intensive discussions and investigation of the Yugoslav system.
 3. Both French and Hungarian party delegations are due in Belgrade sometime this month.

4. Next week, a Hungarian delegation--composed of practically all the key Hungarian leaders and headed by party secretary Gero--will arrive.
5. Soviet "President" Voroshilov will visit Yugoslavia later this month.
- B. Two tentative conclusions can be drawn from these post-Yalta pilgrimages:
 1. There is to be--at least for the present--no explosion in Soviet-Yugoslav relations.
 2. If the Soviet Union had been intending to "crack down" on its erring satellites before the Tito talks, it has been convinced not to--at least for the present. Quieter methods of reasserting Soviet control, of course, may be forthcoming.

VIII. A further measure of Tito's present self-confidence is the tone of Yugoslav propaganda since his return. The press has admitted that ideological differences and unsolved problems in "mutual relations" with the USSR still exist.

- A. But Yugoslav propaganda goes on to say that the fact that these differences are being discussed in an open and sincere exchange of views was a guarantee that Yugoslav-Soviet relations would develop successfully.
1. Furthermore, Belgrade's comment on the reburial of the Hungarian Titoist Rajk called--just as boldly as before the Yalta trip--for continued changes in Hungarian policies.

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II. Out of this Third Act, therefore comes the clear impression that Tito has stuck his ground on the issue of independent Communism.

- A. As a quid pro quo, Tito may have agreed to halt Yugoslav behind-the-scenes activity in Poland and Hungary where we believe he has been active.
- B. As to Yugoslavia's own international position, we have recently seen some signs of moderation.
 1. At the current UN session on Suez, Yugoslavia appears to be trying to play the role of broker between the East and Egypt.
 2. This contrasts to Tito's mid-August propaganda which was wholly pro-Egyptian.
 3. The Yugoslavs are also trying to reinstitute some activity under the Balkan Pact.
 4. This may be largely for appearance's sake, but, Belgrade appears to value the existence of the Pact as something that proves to the East that Yugoslavia is not part of the Bloc and proves to the East that Yugoslavia is firmly maintaining its own independent, non-Bloc position.

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NSC BRIEFING

~~TOP SECRET~~ Add on p. 13

10 October 1956

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SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS

I. At each of our last three meetings, the Council has been told of some new development affecting the Soviet Union in its relations with Eastern Europe--and with Yugoslavia in particular. We had Khrushhev's sudden "vacation" visit to Tito on 19 September, and Tito's dramatic return visit to Yalta on 27 September. As motivation for these visits, we had evidence of Soviet concern over the too-rapid progress of "liberalization" in Satellite Poland and Hungary, and clear indications that the Soviet leadership feared Yugoslavia's "independent" influence in the satellites.

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- A. Although, to date, we have not received the "inside" story on Tito's talks at Yalta, we are now in possession of two extremely sensitive intelligence reports that provide us with valuable insights to the nature and extent of Soviet-Yugoslav differences.
- B. To give this sensitive information in the proper context, it is necessary to go back for a little and examine what could be called the "three acts" that have been played thusfar in this "drama".

II. Act One centers on last June's Moscow love-feast between Tito and the Soviet leaders. Here, as our sensitive information reveals, the public impression of agreement between the two sides was thoroughly misleading. Quite to the contrary, each party had strong and fundamental reservations about the other's position.

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- A. One of our sensitive reports gives us the Soviet analysis of this June meeting. The Soviets concluded that "significant ideological disagreements" existed between themselves and the Yugoslavs and that the Yugoslavs deviated significantly from the sacred Soviet doctrine of Marxism-Leninism.
- B. Our other report gives us the details of the Yugoslav side of these talks--the Soviet positions to which Tito objected, and the alternatives Tito proposed. In summary:
 - 1. The Yugoslavs found the Soviet leaders committed to a "Bloc" policy--the preservation of a strongly-united "Socialist camp" unified in action and directed by the Soviet Union.

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2. As an aid in preserving such "Socialist unity", the Soviet leaders proposed revival of some sort of Cominform.
3. The Yugoslavs objected, and fought for their concept of Communist party independence.
4. On the surface, they win this fight, and the final communique carried the famous "separate roads to socialism" statement.
5. However, the Yugoslavs felt that their victory had been won largely as a result of a "tactical" retreat by the Kremlin leaders, and only in small part because their arguments had persuaded the Soviets.
6. The Yugoslavs nonetheless hoped that, at some future time, they would win genuine Soviet acceptance of their views.

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III. Thus, Act One came to an end with the two parties publicly smoothing over their ideological dispute, but privately agreeing to disagree. We assume the Soviet leaders hoped that their failure to settle this basic issue would not be exposed in the near future, and that the dispute would remain in the realm of theory. Act Two, as we shall see, destroyed these Soviet hopes.

A. Much of the detail in this Second Act has already been related. In general, it involves the growth of "independence" in the Communist world--"independence" often modelled on Tito, and in many cases encouraged by him. There were two major events.

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1. In Poland, where "independence" and "liberalization" were making great strides, the Poznan riots broke out (28 June).
2. In Hungary, the "little Stalin", party boss Rakosi, lost control and was finally ousted in mid-July.

B. These events in the Satellites greatly alarmed the Soviet leaders and their attempts at counter-action were swift.

1. On a 16 July visit to Poland, Premier Bulganin laid down the law. He warned the Poles of the danger of too rapid "democratization", and sharply pointed out that Poland's western boundary with Germany was only as secure as its alliance with the Soviet Union.

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2. In mid-July, Soviet Deputy Premier Mikoyan travelled to Hungary, presumably to salvage what he could by seeing that a "reliable" man, Gero, replaced Rakosi.

IV. However, neither the Poles nor the Hungarians responded to Moscow's warnings and restraints.

- A. The trend toward "democratization" and "independence" within the Polish and Hungarian Communist Parties continued unchecked.
- B. The Soviet conviction that Tito--by example and encouragement--was the big fly in the Satellite ointment is evidenced by the next Kremlin move to reassert control. This was the Soviet Communist Party's 3 September secret warning to the Satellites (regarding which I briefed the Council two weeks ago) that Yugoslavia was not a suitable model for any respectable Leninist Satellite to follow. This new warning closes Act Two.

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V. Act Three brings us to the events of the past three weeks, beginning with Khrushchev's arrival in Belgrade on 19 September. The Soviet motivation for this trip is reasonably clear.

- A. Both the Poles and the Hungarians had failed to respond to the 3 September warning. This must have convinced all the Soviet leaders that something urgent had to be done about the Satellite problem.
- B. The Yugoslavs, for their part, had viewed with alarm the summer-long Soviet backsliding from its "liberal" policy towards the Satellites.
- C. Tito was also alarmed by evidence of Soviet duplicity concerning the "separate roads" concept, and the increasingly hostile Soviet attitude toward Yugoslavia itself.

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- C. Because both sides had a vested interest in the maintenance of relations, and neither side desired an open break, person-to-person conversations appeared necessary to avoid a rupture.
- VI. Last week, the Council heard the Yugoslav version of the Khrushchev-Tito talks in Brioni, in which Khrushchev verified the Soviet reversal on the concept of "separate roads to socialism."
 - A. This reversal, coming from Khrushchev himself--the man the Yugoslavs held to be the most willing of all Soviet leaders to push the new "liberal" policy toward Yugoslavia and Eastern Europe--was a shock to Tito.
 - B. When Khrushchev then invited Tito to Yalta to continue their discussions, Tito accepted--in hopes he could persuade the Soviet leaders to modify their reversal.

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C. During his week at Yalta, Tito met with Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kirichenko (party boss in the Ukraine), General Serov (the security police chief), Marshal Grechko (Berlin garrison commander) and others.

VII. We still do not know the substance of these conversations. However, they almost certainly revolved around the same questions of ideological dispute as last June. Whatever their eventual outcome, the immediate effect has not altered Tito's "independent" stand.

A. Since Tito's return, Belgrade has become a minor Mecca for visiting Communists. Most of these visits had been arranged long before the Yalta trip, but the dates of some have apparently been advanced.

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1. A Bulgarian "parliamentary" delegation--present in Yugoslavia before Tito's trip--dropped its thin disguise on his return and signed a party-to-party agreement to re-establish ties.
2. An Italian Communist delegation has arrived, for intensive discussions and investigation of the Yugoslav system.
3. Both French and Rumanian party delegations are due in Belgrade sometime this month.
4. Next week, a Hungarian delegation--composed of practically all the key Hungarian leaders and headed by party secretary Gero--will arrive.

B. Furthermore, Yugoslav relations with the Soviet Union itself are being carried on with an appearance of public amity.

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1. A Soviet Komsomol (youth) delegation has just arrived in Belgrade.
2. Soviet "President" Voroshilov is scheduled to visit Yugoslavia this month.
3. On Wednesday (10 October), the Yugoslavs announced that a high-level military delegation had departed for the Soviet Union, to visit military factories and installations. This is the second Yugoslav military delegation ever to visit the Soviet Union.

C. A further noteworthy fact is the confident tone of Yugoslav propaganda since Tito's return.

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1. The Yugoslav press has admitted that ideological differences and unsolved problems in "mutual relations" with the Soviet Union still exist.
2. But Yugoslav propaganda goes on to say that the very discussion of these differences, in an open and sincere exchange of views, is a guarantee that Yugoslav-Soviet relations will develop successfully.
3. Furthermore, Belgrade, in editorial comment on the reburial of the Hungarian Titoist Rajk [pronounced "Rike"] called-- just as boldly as before the Yalta trip--for continued changes in Hungarian policies.
4. Finally, today's copy of ^{23/2} SOPRAN triumphantly suggests that the Soviet party will not circulate any

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VIII. Some tentative conclusions can be drawn from these post-Yalta events.

- A. At least for the present, some sort of accommodation has been reached in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Tito is not being sealed off from contacts with the Soviet Union and the Satellites.
- B. The most recent developments in Poland and Hungary are further demonstrations that the Soviet Union is not going to "crack down" hard on its Satellites--at least for the present.
- C. Quieter methods of reasserting Soviet control, of course, may be tried--although we find it difficult to see how quiet methods can be successful.

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IX. Out of this Third Act, therefore, come the conclusion that Tito has so far stood his ground on the issue of independent Communism.

A. This conclusion is, of course, tentative. We shall now have to watch both Yugoslav and Soviet actions closely, to see what sort of accommodation was worked out in Yalta--or is still being worked out--and how long it can last. We still lack evidence: for example, our Ambassador to Yugoslavia has not yet been able to visit Tito since his return from Yalta.

B. It is no exaggeration to say that the whole problem of Soviet-Satellite relations is one that will be the subject of pulling and hauling for years to come.

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1. If we were to predict on the basis of Tito's past actions, we would expect Yugoslavia to base its future policy toward the Soviet Bloc on the degree to which the Soviet leaders actually accept Tito's kind of "independent" Communism as a real thing.
2. Thus, much more depends on Moscow than on Belgrade in the future. Can the Soviet leaders solve the dilemma they are facing in Hungary and Poland without a full-scale reversion to iron Stalinist control? The evidence of the next few months will probably do much to give us the answer.

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